

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9719

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS - FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: NEED FOR RAPID DECISION ON
STABILIZING MEASURES

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. FOR TACTICAL REASONS, THERE IS NEED FOR
DEFINITIVE DECISION BY ALLIES BEFORE CHRISTMAS BREAK AT NATO ON
ISSUE OF HOW TO PLAY STABILIZING MEASURES. WE BELIEVE ACTION NOW
BY US IS NECESSARY TO PRECIPITATE THIS PROMPT ALLIED DECISION.
WE THINK THERE MAY BE TACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN PRESENTING TO EAST
PROGRAM OF STABILIZATION MEASURES WASHINGTON HAS PROPOSED TO
ALLIES EVEN IF IT PROVES POSSIBLE TO GET ALLIED AGREEMENT TO
PRESENT THIS PROGRAM. MANY CONSIDERATIONS ARGUE IN FAVOR OF
NEGOTIATING ON STABILIZING MEASURES IN CONJUNCTION WITH REDUCTIONS.
ACTION REQUESTED: WE RECOMMENT THAT WASHINGTON APPROACH THE UK AND
FRG MAKING STRONG CASE FOR POSTPONING DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING
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MEASURES UNTIL FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS. IF THEY
NEVERTHELESS INSIST ON DISCUSSION PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS, THEN U.S.
MIGHT AGREE PROVIDED MEASURES WERE LIMITED SOLELY TO MEASURES ONE
AND TWO OF ALLIED MBFR POSITION PAPER. END SUMMARY.

2. THERE IS A COMPELLING TACTICAL NEED FOR RAPID ALLIED DECISIONS ON STABILIZING MEASURES. THE AD HOC GROUP HAS AGREED THAT FOUR PLENARY PRESENTATIONS ON THE ALLIED OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE THE MID-DECEMBER BREAK. ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT TENTATIVE ALLIED SCHEDULE, THE PRESENTATION COVERING ASSOCIATED MEASURES WOULD BE DELIVERED ON OR ABOUT DECEMBER 11. THIS PRESENTATION SHOULD EXPAND ON THE NOVEMBER 22 OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS AS THEY CONCERN ASSOCIATED MEASURES. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DESIRABLE IF IN THIS PRESENTATION ALLIES IN VIENNA COULD AT LEAST DESCRIBE THE TITLES OF SPECIFIC MEASURES ON WHICH THEY WOULD LATER PRESENT MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. FOR THEM TO BE ABLE TO DO SO WOULD REQUIRE ALLIED DECISION AT BRUSSELS BY ABOUT DECEMBER 7TH AT THE LATEST.

3. AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TACTICAL CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE ALLIES REACH A DECISION BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS BREAK AT NATO AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE GOING TO ENGAGE IN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES EARLY IN JANUARY, AND IF SO, WHICH ONES, TOGETHER WITH GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE DETAILS OF THOSE MEASURES SELECTED. IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THIS INFORMATION BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR IN ORDER TO LAY OUT AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY AND PRESENTATION FOR MID-JANUARY.

4. THERE IS NO SIGN AS YET OF ALLIED AGREEMENT IN BRUSSELS ON THE CONTENT OF STABILIZING MEASURES OF THEIR TACTICAL TREATMENT. WE BELIEVE SOME NEW US ACTION WILL BE NEEDED IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE NECESSARY TIMELY DECISION. WE DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO GAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT THAT THE MEASURES MOST RECENTLY PROPOSED BY THE US SHOULD REPRESENT THE TOTAL PROGRAM OF STABILIZING MEASURES THE ALLIES WOULD PROPOSE DURING THE WHOLE COURSE OF PHASE I OF NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, WE SEE TACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO NEGOTIATE THE PROPOSED PACKAGE WITH THE EAST. PUTTING DOWN A LARGE PACKAGE OF AT LEAST FOUR MEASURES WILL ELICIT INTENSIFIED CRITICISM FROM THE EAST THAT THE ALLIES ARE DELIBERATELY DELAYING DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS.

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ONCE TABLED WITH THE EAST, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DISENGAGE THE ALLIES FROM DISCUSSION OF THIS PACKAGE IN ORDER TO MOVE TO DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS. SOME ALLIES WILL INSIST THAT A SERIOUS EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT ON SOME OF THE MEASURES PRIOR TO MOVING ON TO DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH THE FIRST TWO OF THE MEASURES PROPOSED E.G. PREANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS AND EXERCISES WOULD PRESUMABLY BE SUBSUMED IN ANY NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS AND THE FOURTH ON EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS IS OF LIMITED CONSEQUENCE, MEASURES NUMBER THREE ON LIMITING EXTENT AND DURATION OF EXERCISES HAS SOME POTENTIAL REAL SUBSTANCE IN IT. ITS ULTIMATE ACCEPTABILITY WOULD PROBABLY BE JEOPARDIZED BY TABLING IT EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND LEAVING ITS STATUS UNRESOLVED.

5. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, US OBJECTIVE IS TO MOVE AS DIRECTLY AS POSSIBLE TO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS AND NOT TO GET BOGGED DOWN IN A DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES AT THIS POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIED POSITION. IN THE LIGHT OF ACTUAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE VIENNA TALKS, THERE IS IN FACT A COGENT CASE FOR DROPPING PRE-REDUCTION DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES AND PROCEEDING WITH DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS. AMONG THE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IS THE FACT THAT, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATION, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT HUNG BACK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAITING TO BE DRAWN BY THE ALLIES INTO TAKING SOME SPECIFIC POSITION IN A SLOW AND LABORIOUS PROCESS. INSTEAD, THEY HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE OF TABLING A REDUCTION PROPOSAL OF THEIR OWN. THE ALLIES HAVE RESPONDED RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY BY TABLING THEIR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY DEVELOPED A CERTAIN MOMENTUM AT AN UNEXPECTEDLY EARLY STAGE. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH THE ACCURACY OF THIS EVALUATION REMAINS TO BE DEMONSTRATED THROUGH FURTHER NEGOTIATION, THERE APPEAR TO BE SOME SIGNS OF GIVE ON THE SOVIET SIDE WITH REGARD TO FOCUS ON US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE ALLIED TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT MOMENTUM AND TO TRY TO CHANNEL IT IN THE DIRECTION OF OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A FIRST PHASE REDUCTION CONSISTING OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES, AS WELL AS COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

6. HENCE THE EARLIER ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF HAVING A DISCUSSION
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OF STABILIZING MEASURES PRIOR TO DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN SOVIET INTENTIONS SEEMS OVERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET ACTION IN TABLING THEIR OWN PROPOSALS. LEAVING ASIDE THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF THEIR PROPOSALS, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW DEMONSTRATED THAT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NEGOTIATIONS IS BUSINESSLIKE AND NOT DILATORY. WHILE IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THIS OUTCOME DOES NOT APPEAR LIKELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, AN INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES PRIOR TO DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS COULD APPEAR A TACTICAL DEFEAT FOR THE ALLIES AND HALT THE MOMENTUM OF AN ALLIED PUSH FOR EARLY SOVIET AGREEMENT TO FOCUS ON US-SOVIET FORCES. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE STABILIZING MEASURES NOW UNDER DISCUSSION DEAL WITH LIMITATIONS ON GROUND FORCES. TO THIS EXTENT, THEY PRESENT THIS ISSUE TO THE EAST FOR DECISION IN THE LESS FAVORABLE CONTEXT OF STABILIZING MEASURES RATHER THAN THE CONTEXT OF REDUCTIONS WHERE THE ALLIES ARE ON MORE FAVORABLE TERRAIN.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS - FROM US REP MBFR

7. WITH REGARD TO CONTENT OF THE MEASURES PROPOSED, ONLY MEASURE THREE HAS REAL SUBSTANCE IN TERMS OF LIMITING SOVIET CAPACITY TO USE MILITARY STRENGTH AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL PRESSURE ON WESTERN EUROPE. BUT IT, LIKE MEASURES TWO AND FOUR, RAISES DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF LIMITATIONS ON EUROPEAN NATO FORCES, OF SPECIFYING AREA, AND OF POSSIBLE EXTENSION TO THE USSR, WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. WASHINGTON HAS RAISED OBJECTIONS TO THE UK PROPOSAL FOR A TIME-LIMITED MANPOWER FREEZE. THERE ARE ALSO IMPORTANT PRACTICAL AS WELL AS INTRINSIC CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES PRIOR TO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS. ALL THE MEASURES PROPOSED THUS FAR REQUIRE CAREFUL AND TIME-CONSUMING SCRUTINY OF DETAILS BEFORE PRESENTATION. IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT THIS PROCESS AND APPROVAL BY NAC CAN BE COMPLETED BY THE TIME WHEN THE MEASURES ARE NEEDED FOR PRESENTATION IN MID-JANUARY. THESE CONSIDERATIONS ALL ARGUE FOR A DECISION TO PRESENT STABILIZING MEASURES IN THE SECRET

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IMPROVED NEGOTIATING ATMOSPHERE WHICH WOULD ARISE FROM MOVEMENT TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS.

8. UK AND FRG SEEM TO BE THE ONLY REALLY ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN CURRENT NATO DISCUSSIONS ON SUBJECT OF STABILIZING MEASURES. WE BELIEVE BEST WAY TO PRECIPITATE NEEDED RAPID ALLIED DECISIONS ON STABILIZING MEASURES MAY BE TO APPROACH LONDON AND BONN,

MAKING STRONG CASE ON LINES ABOVE AGAINST EARLY DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES AND IN FAVOR OF DISCUSSING OF STABILIZING MEASURES FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS. IF UK AND FRG THEN CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A DISCUSSION OF STABILIZING MEASURES PRIOR TO DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS, WE MIGHT AGREE TO THIS, ON THE CONDITION THAT IN VIEW OF THE CHANGED TACTICAL SITUATION AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM, THE STABILIZING MEASURES TABLED AT THIS TIME BE LIMITED TO A MINIMUM PACKAGE COMPOSED OF ITEM 1 AND 2 FROM ALLIED PAPER, I.E. PRIOR TO NOTIFICATION OF US AND SOVIET MOVEMENTS INTO THE AREA, AND PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES, INCLUDING THOSE OF EUROPEAN FORCES, IN AREA. ANYTHING MORE WOULD NOT BE A MANAGEABLE PACKAGE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. IT IS BELIEVED THIS APPROACH WOULD BRING ABOUT A RAPID DECISION ON THE PART OF UK AND FRG AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN NATO. IF THE DECISION IS TO PROCEED WITH A LIMITED PRESENTATION, IT WILL BE RECOLLECTED THAT BOTH FRG AND UK HAVE ALREADY AGREED THAT MEASURE ONE COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH EAST. FOR THEM TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TWO WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE GERMANS DROP THE IDEA THAT THIS MEASURE SHOULD EXTEND BEYOND REDUCTION AREA AND THAT THE UK ACCEPT THAT THE MEASURE SHOULD APPLY TO EUROPEAN AS WELL AS US AND SOVIET FORCES. UK AGREEMENT TO THIS CONCEPT AND THE NEGOTIABILITY OF BOTH MEASURES WITH EAST WOULD BE FACILITATED IF THE US AGREED TO THE UK CONCEPT THAT THESE MEASURES SHOULD IF AGREED PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS BE OF A YEAR'S DURATION. IF EITHER FRG OR UK DO NOT AGREE TO THIS LIMITED PACKAGE, WE SHOULD RETURN FIRMLY TO IDEA THAT STABILIZING MEASURES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED ONLY AFTER AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN REACHED.

10. IF DECISION IS IN FAVOR OF A LIMITED PACKAGE ON LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE, A RELATIVELY EXPEDITIOUS GENERAL TREATMENT (3-4 WEEKS) OF THE PACKAGE WITH THE EAST SHOULD BE POSSIBLE PROVIDED NATO HAS GIVEN GENERAL ACCEPTANCE TO US PROPOSALS AS SECRET

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TO DETAILS PRIOR TO CHRISTMAS BREAK. WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THEIR CONTENT, THE FACT THAT MEASURE NUMBER ONE DEALS WITH US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES COULD BE OF SOME HELP IN PUSHING IDEA OF FIRST PHASE FOCUS ON THIS SUBJECT, WHILE THE FACT THAT MEASURE NUMBER TWO WOULD ALSO DEAL WITH EUROPEAN FORCES COULD BE USED AS EVIDENCE OF ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO COVER EUROPEAN FORCES IN PHASE II.

1. IF, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THE SOVIETS SHOW SERIOUS INTEREST IN THE MEASURES SPECIFIED IT MIGHT TAKE FURTHER TIME TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THEIR PROVISIONS. IN THIS EVENT, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SHIFT DISCUSSION OF DETAILS TO A WORKING GROUP AND TAKE UP DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS.

12. A SHORT DRAFT FOR POSSIBLE NAC AGREEMENT COVERING THIS POSSIBILITY MIGHT LOOK AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

THE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN AGREEMENTS RELATING TO THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, MINDFUL OF THEIR INTENTION TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, DECLARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE USSR AND THE US WILL PRE-NOTIFY THE MOVEMENT OF ACTIVE DUTY GROUND FORCES PERSONNEL INTO OR OUT OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. PRE-NOTIFICATION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS TO BE SET OUT IN AN ANNEX (WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE GENERAL TERMS SET FORTH IN THE ANNEX TO THE UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM ON STABILIZATION PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 12.).

2. EACH PARTY HERETO WILL PRE-NOTIFY MAJOR EXERCISE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION IN WHICH ITS PERSONNEL ARE TO TAKE PART. PRE-NOTIFICATION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN AN ANNEX (WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE GENERAL TERMS SET FORTH IN THE ANNEX TO THE UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM ON STABILIZATION PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 12.).

3. THE TERM "AREA OF REDUCTIONS" AS USED IN THIS
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DECLARATION SHALL MEAN THE TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, AND POLAND. THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS, OR MEASURES REMAINS TO BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED.

4. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DECLARATION SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THIS DECLARATION. THEREAFTER THE PARTIES HERETO WILL AGREE ON THE RENEWAL OF SUCH PROVISIONS OF THIS DECLARATION AS THEY MAY STILL DEEM TO BE APPROPRIATE. END TEXT.HUMES

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